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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
element would be particularly important in view of the well estab-
lished rule that rents belong to the owner of property on rent day.1"
Therefore it is submitted that our court reached a result not
only in accord with the weight of authority, but, what is more
important, also in accord with the policy of maintaining practical
and well settled rules concerning wills and their construction.
J. G. McC.
ESTOPPEL BY DEED - CONVEYANCE OF INTEREST SUBSEQUENTLY
ACQUIRED AS HER - WARRANTY IN QUITCLAim DEED As BAsIS FOR
ESTOPPEL. -- T devised to W, his wife, a life estate in his property,
with power of consumption of the corpus for her support, re-
mainder to his children in fee, share and share alike. In 1929 A,
one of the children, gave a deed of trust for his share, with coven-
ants of general warranty, and in the same year two judgments
were obtained against him. W died intestate in 1932. A lien
creditors' suit was thereafter brought to subject A's interest in the
property to sale in satisfaction of the judgments. Held, that since
W had absolute power of disposition over the property, and there-
fore took the fee, the children took no interest unddr the will; that
A had nothing to convey and conveyed nothing by his deed of
trust; that the deed could not operate as an assignment of an
expectancy in the property; that therefore, since the property
descended to A by intestacy in 1932 and not before, it then became
subject to the judgment liens, and the grantee and cestui under
the trust deed took no interest. Swan 'v. Pople.
Under a theory of estoppel by deed this property, an un-
divided one-seventh interest in the testator's estate, would have
passed under the trust deed, as soon as the son became entitled
to it. The applicable rule is that if a grantor having no title or
defective title, or an estate less than that which he assumes to
grant, conveys with warranty or covenants of like import and sub-
sequently acquires the title or estate which he purports to convey,
or perfects his title, such after-acquired or after-perfected title will
enure to the grantee or to his benefit by way of estoppel.2 It is
i3Rockingham v. Penrice. 1 P. Wns. 177 (1711).
1 190 S. E. 902 (W. Va. 1937).
SIrvin v. Stover, 67 W. Va. 356, 67 S. E. 1119 (1910); Blake v. O'Neal,
63 W. Va. 483, 61 S. E. 410 (1908) ; Yock v. Mann, 57 W. Va. 187, 49 S. E.
1019 (1905); Clark v. Sayers & Lambert, 55 W. Va. 512, 47 S. B. 312 (1904);
Summerfield v. White, 54 W. Va. 311, 46 S. E. 154 (1903); Mfitchell v. Petty,
2 W. Va. 470, 98 Am. Dec. 777 (1868).
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also settled that as between mortgagor and mortgagee, a mortgage
with covenants of warranty will pass an after-acquired title.'
These principles are fairly well established, so the real problems
involved are: (1) the conveyance of an interest which the grantor
subsequently takes as an heir, and (2) whether the description of
the property in the trust deed is sufficient to create an estoppel.
Many jurisdictions hold that an attempt by an heir to convey
an expectancy is absolutely void and connot serve as the basis of
an estoppel.4  The present deed, however is not an attempt to
convey an expectancy; the court in its opinion specifically negatives
this proposition. The deed purports to convey a present interest;
and the rule in West Virginia seems to be that in such case, even
though the land does eventually come to the grantor through in-
heritance, it will enure to the benefit of the grantee.' An excellent
illustration of the present issue occurs in a Texas case,0 where the
father and mother of seven children owned an estate in common.
The former died in 1883, his wife surviving until 1911. In 1888
one child made a present conveyance of an undivided one-seventh
interest in the land by warranty deed, "the interest in and to the
same hereby conveyed being the interest which descended to me as
son and heir" of these parents. The grantor had inherited nothing
from the mother because she was still living. The court observed,
"we think that on its face, it [the deed] is unambiguous and
clearly purports to convey an entire one-seventh interest in the
land described in the deed. Such being the terms of the deed, we
think, in accordance with familiar authorities, that the general war-
ranty quoted was sufficient to convey the after-acquired title which
descended to [the grantor] upon the death of his mother." Similar-
a Edwards v. Davenport, 20 Fed. 756, 4 McCrary 34 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1883) ;
Ross v. Harney, 139 IlL App. 513 (1908); Ayer v. Philadelphia & B. Brick Co.,
157 Mass. 57, 31 N. E. 717 (1892) ; Northrup v. Ackerman, 84 N. J. Eq. 117,
92 Atl. 909 (1915).
4 It must not appear on the face of the deed that at the time of the execu-
tion the subsequently acquired title was outstanding in third parties, and not
in the grantor or mortgagor. Flatt v. Flatt, 189 Ky. 801, 225 S. W. 1067
(1920); Dailey v. Springfield, 144 Ga. 395, 87 S. E. 479 (1915); Spacoy v.
Close, 184 Ky. 523, 212 S. W. 127 (1919).
5 Buford v. Adair, 43 W. Va. 211, 27 S. E. 260 (1897), grantor deeded prop-
erty in which she had remote contingent right. Held, that whether sufficient
or not as a conveyance, it operated as an estoppel in favor of a purchaser in
good faith. Custer v. Hall, 71 W. Va. 119, 76 S. E. 183 (1912), where husband
and wife had deeded land with warranties, and the deed was bad as to the wife,
when the husband inherited her interest as her heir, he was estopped to claim
title to this interest.
6 Pritchard v. Fox, 154 S. W. 1058 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
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ly, in a recent West Virginia opinion7 by the judge who wrote the
opinion in Swan v. Pople, there was a present conveyanc4 of land
subsequently inherited. Although this conveyance was theld not
to give rise to an estoppel by deed, because of lack of a warranty,
the court indicated by dicta that had there been a warranty,
estoppel would have applied.
A difficult issue arises in the present case as to whether the
terms of the deed were such as to support an estoppel.' The instru-
ment purported to convey by warranty all of the "right, title and
interest" devised to the son by the provisions of the testator's will.
"Deeds and mortgages, in this respect [as to estoppel by deed]
seem to stand on the same footing, although in case of mortgages
there may be stronger reasons for sustaining the rule, because of
the continuing relations arising from the very nature of the trans-
action.'' 9 Obviously, the question of estoppel depends on the in-
tent of the parties as gathered from the deed or mortgage as a
whole.'0 The court in the instant case said, "It would seem that
the grantor attempted to convey and warranted that which he
tiwugiht he took under the will." At least one leading jurisdiction
holds a warranty, following the conveyance of merely the grantor's
right, title and interest, if made in such form as to be construed
as being more extensive than the conveyance, creates an estoppel
co-extensive with the covenant."- It would thus seem that the trust
deed relied on might have been sufficient to convey by estoppel the
after-acquired title. Moreover, as furthering this contention, there
is some authority to the effect that estoppel based on mortgages is
subject to very little limitation.. 2
The West Virginia rule is that a covenant of general warranty
7 Egnor v. Roberts, 191 S. E. 532 (W. Va. 1937).
8 The trust deed, after stating that it conveyed with general warranties 4"all
of the following described property and property rights . . . owned and pos-
sessed, or to which they or either of them, is entitled to own and possess in
and to all of the real and personal estate of every kind and description owned
and possessed by [testator] ... the same being more particularly described as
follows .... I then specified:
11. All Qf the right, title and interest of every kind and description in and
to all of the real estate that was, and is, devised unto the said [devisee] ....
one of the parties of the first part, in and by the terms and provisions of the
last will and testament of [testator] ....
9 Note (1929) 58 A. L. R. 350, 356.
10 Id. at 358.
n Ayer v. Philadelphia & B. Brick Co., 159 Mass. 84, 34 N. E. 177 (1893).
12 "The rule of estoppel to assert an after-acquired title or interest has been
stated in general terms, in cases of mortgages, from which the inference might
be drawn that the court regarded the rule to be that a mortgagor, regardless
3
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in a deed does not enlarge the estate thereby granted.13 In other
words it would seem that a quitclaim deed, even though it contain
a covenant of general warranty, will not operate as the basis of an
estoppel. However, this rule should be subject to certain quali-
fications. The effect of language in a deed is to be gathered from
the whole of it, not disjointed parts, so as to give effect to the whole
instrument. The intention of the grantor as derived from the deed
itself should be sought after, and if discovered, should be carried
into effect, if it can be done consistently with rules of law.14 Modern
construction has leaned towards the intention overriding mere form
and technical words, and the intention must rule the construction
in deeds as well as in wills. 5 One jurisdiction, in a case very
similar to this, held that a grant of "all the grantor's estate, right,
title and interest whatsoever under the will of [the testator] or
otherwise," operated as the basis of an estoppel even in the absence
of covenants.18  The present deed,17 although the describing clause
is technically in the form of a quitclaim deed, indicates an attempt
not to pass the right, title and interest actually conveyed by the
will, but the interest evidenced by the terms of the will.' s If it is
determined that this is the evident intent of the deed, the grantor
and his privies should be estopped from asserting the after-acquired
title.19
No question can be raised as to the operation of an estoppel
as against judgment creditors. It is clear that estoppel of the
grantor is binding on those in privity with him, and a judgment
of the terms, recitals, or covenants of the mortgage, is estopped to assert an
after-acquired title or interest." Note (1929) 58 A. L. R. 391 (numerous
additional citations under this note).
13 King v. Smith, 88 W. Va. 312, 106 S. E. 704 (1921); Hull's Adm'r v.
Hull's Heirs, 35 W. Va. 155, 13 S. E. 49 (1891).
l4 Uhl v. Ohio River R. R. Co., 51 W. Va. 106, 41 S. E. 340 (1902).
15 Ibid. W. Va. Rev. Code (1931) c. 36, art. 4, §, 17.
16 Hannon v. Christopher, 34 N. 3. Eq. 459 (1881).
17 upra n. 8.
1s "It would seem that the grantor attempted to convey and warranted that
which he thought he took under the will." Swan v. Pople, 190 S. E. 902 (W.
Va. 1937).
19 The general rule is that a quitclaim deed conveys only the existing interest,
but thisprinciple is applicable to a deed by'release or quitclaim, in the strict
and proper sense of that species of conveyance. And therefore, if the deed
bears on its face evidence that the grantors intended to convey, and the grantee
expected to become invested with, an estate of a particular description or
quality, and that the bargain had proceeded on that footing between the parties,
then estoppel by deed will apply. Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 52 U. S. 297,
301, 13 L. Ed. 703 (1850).
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creditor is privy to the judgment debtor.20 Whether or not the
trust deed preceded the lien in point of time is immaterial; even
though the judgment lien had priority, this would not prevent the
land from passing to the grantee by estoppel subject to the
judgment lien.2 '
The general rule is that estoppel by deed must be specially
pleaded in order to be availed of.22 From the opinion it does not
appear that there was such a plea; therefore the court could not
have considered it.
J. H. H.
MASTER AND SERvANT - LiABn OF MASTM FOR SERVANT'S
NEGLIGENCE IN DRIVING M1ASTER'S CAR TO SERVANT's HomIE. - The
sales-manager of the used car departmeht of the defendant com-
pany had the right to use the cars of the company for his owh
personal purposes as well as for business uses. After a "frolic of
his own," which terminated after working hours, he drove past the
used car department to see if all the cars were in for the night. On
the way home from there (a number of blocks from the place of
business) he negligently ran over the plaintiff, who recovered
judgment against the driver and the defendant company, owner of
the car. The owner appealed contending that the court should
have directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that the
salesman was not at the time acting within the scope of his employ-
ment. Held, that the question whether or not the driver was actt-
ing within the scope of his employment was properly submitted to
the jury. Judgment was reversed on other grounds. Meyn v. Du-
laney-Mifler Auto Go.-
In its opinion the court states that generally where a servant
has permission to use a car in order better to execute his business
2 
oEgnor v. Roberts, 191 S. E. 532 (W. Va. 1937), at a judicial sale, a pur-
chaser obtains the whole title and interest in the property sold, which was
vested in the owner at the time of the sale and no more. Freudenberger Oil
Co. v. Gardner, 79 W. Va. 46, 90 S. E. 815 (1916); Bennett v. Booth, 70 W.
Va. 264, 73 S. E. 909 (1912) ; Snyder v. Botkin, 37 W. Va. 355, 16 S. E. 591
(1892).
21 A debtor against whom there existed a judgment lien gave warranty deed
of land which he expected to inherit. The land subsequently descended and the
court held that the grantee took the land subject to the judgment lien.
Bliss v. Brown, 78 Kan. 467, 96 Pae. 945 (1908).
S2Estoppel by deed must be specially pleaded or considered as waived,
McCorkell v. Herron, 128 Iowa 324, 103 N. W. 988 (1905) ; Hanson v. Buckner,
4 Dana 251, 29 Am. Dec. 401 (Ky. 1836).
1 191 S. E. 558 (W. Va. 1937).
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